The Velvet Glove

From the pages of 1901 and All That, until recently published by Mick Bullock of Yorkshire, U.K., we have received rumors of a large, well-organized cartel, or system of multi-game and game-long alliances.

 

The thing apparently began secretly, cover eventually being blown by one of the insiders. The basic common agreement seems to have been shrewdly limited, so as to permit the members a fair degree of freedom, including wars against each other, victory by combat rather than agreed draws and concessions, and so forth, while maintaining restrictions such as no stabbing of a fellow Karman. The rules seem to have changed from time to time, possibly in some cases in response to outside criticism. As in the case of American cartels, opponents tend to regard the Karma League as stultifying and somewhat missing the point of the game, while defenders regard it as the smart way to play, and also a matter of personal preference fortrustworthy allies, etc.

 

I first became aware of the Karma League when I received 1901…. No.72, dated Nov. 19, 1976. A game had just been won by a Karman, and open debate over the institution appeared in the issue and in subsequent issues.

The winner, David Barnes, Russia, wrote:

 

“The Treaty of Budapest” signed before S.01 by three players 90% sure that the others would not break the Treaty simply stated that the parties to the Treaty would not attack the homeland spaces of the other two. There was no agreement to a 3-way win, only an implied agreement to share the first three places insofar as the Treaty was game long. (I understand this is unusual for Karma League Treaties.)

 

“The Treaty was kept by all parties at all times. Perhaps mutual trust, or perhaps knowledge that a break of the Treaty would have brought instant retribution from the other two, whatever it was…. So, it was virtually certain that we three would divide the first three places among us. I fail to understand what is wrong with that….”

 

We note that he makes no mention that the Treaty might have been enforced by dropping the violator from the Karma League, which League will appear in future games and probably was operating in other games at the same time. This fact seems to be the principal point of difference between the Karma League and any game-long 3-way alliance. Bullock breaks in to say: “Only that you’re destroying the whole point of Diplomacy, which is a battle of wits (with a smattering of tactical skills thrown in) against six other players….” Bullock calls the game “tedious” and “the Bore War of the year” and continues:

 

“The game was all but over when Turkey penned this immortal press release in Autumn ’02!: ‘The governments of Austria, Russia, Turkey hereby issue an ultimatum…that unless you concede victory to the alliance immediately, you will be eliminated before England (which was already in anarchy!)…Such a concession will secure for you at least equal fourth place…We already hold 18 centres between us.’ ”

 

This release reveals in passing that Turkey, at least, was quite willing to take a 3-way draw as early as 1902. Good idea, since he had by far the worst position if he kept the alliance, being heavily closed off by his two allies. Turkey kept to the convention and lost. The Turkish player, David Wheeler, however, defended the Karma League in his post-game statement:

 

“Since it is written into the Karma League rules that allies shall be free to attack each other outside their homelands after the reduction of other powers, a decisive result is more likely than in games where there is no KL element. This was not a conceded win… Turkey would have been eliminated, but for the Karma League. I still think that 3 KL members will certainly beat the other 4 and that 2 KL members would probably beat the other 5. What fascinates me about Diplomacy is its similarity to real life.”

 

John Piggott, in the same issue, doesn’t think a fighting win is very likely among Karmans: “The KL object of a Diplomacy game isn’t to win by getting 18 centres, but to ‘win’ by getting 10.”

 

On the number of Karmans, Bullock says: “… [The] last time someone infiltrated [the League] the names were published…there were about 15 names on the list, but I think it was a couple of years or more ago.”

 

Richard Sharp, also opposed to “the Karma League nonsense,” says:

 

“A player is one whose every decision is based on a single criterion: he wants to win… A cheat is one who enters a game with no intention of winning it, and whose moves are directed, deliberately, to some other purpose, such as obtaining a draw or allowing another player to win… Cheats should be banned. A moron is one whose moves are based on keeping of treaties, irrespective of the results thereof… . If I find myself in a game with David Wheeler, I shall naturally join the Karma League with alacrity, this being the easiest way to neutralize him. Question: Will he refuse me membership on the grounds of my reputation and well known views?”

 

Jonathan Palfrey looks ahead rapidly and expects the thesis to generate its own anti-thesis:

 

“They will become feared and so there will be an increasing tendency for non-Karmans to ally (and stay allied!) against them – so that, in effect, games including Karmans would become struggles between themselves and others. So the thing would become a kind of power struggle transcending the individual game, a fight for the survival of the Karma League as an effective force in British Diplomacy… . Look on it as an extension of the game. A kind of trans-game Diplomacy, really.”

 

Bullock replies that they do not announce themselves until, perhaps, 1902, when they say, “We own 18 centres between us. Surrender now.” He calls it a “cancerous growth” rather than an extension of the game. It is nowhere noted, however, that the 4 non-Karmans, say, in a game may well include perhaps one beginner and maybe one other who is not aware of the Karman problem. To stop the Karma League, these players must be educated to the entire problem before the end of 1902, by players who may not even know they have the KL on their hands in Winter ’00. Bullock, however, does raise for the very first time, to my knowledge, a question of gamesmaster reasonability:

 

“I begin to wonder how much it is my responsibility to the ordinary players, the newish ones especially, to protect the unsuspecting from cross-game alliances (i.e. esp. KL, but others too)… . One player has played in only four 1901 games, but has arranged to have the same ally in all four….”

 

He recognizes that there is no cut and dried method of classifying players so as to break up expected alliances by regulating entry into the game. He attempts a cross table to show alliances or clashes or play together (it is not clear) in each pair of players in his games, to form some objective basis for classification.

 

Jonathan Palfrey [in issue No. 74] no longer likes the idea of bunching up against the Karman threat:

 

“The method of non-Karmans ganging up on Karmans… is not a good or stable solution – the games where this occurred would be largely ruined, and doubtless much genuine hostility created. A better method, if the KL refuses to retire gracefully, would be for non-Karmans to refuse to play in games containing more than one Karman.

 

“It is of course necessary that Karmans be identified. A secret KL (or other gang – what’s in a name?) must, I think, be regarded as unethical, though I come to this conclusion reluctantly; firstly because Dippy is supposed to be the game in which ‘anything goes,’ and secondly because calling it unethical isn’t a complete solution to the problem.”

 

Bullock replies with an interesting inversion of morals: “Perhaps then we must accept that ‘anything goes’ is too high an ideal; that we must lower our ideal to cater for ethics and the fabric.”

 

Hell of a universe in which ‘anything goes’ leads to unacceptable stultification!

 

In Issue No. 75, Feb. 4, 1977, David Yule writes again [in defense of the Karma League] to argue:

 

“The only really important factor is that all players be allowed to participate in the manner that THEY choose.” In answer to J. Palfrey he says, quite unbelievably, “A secret KL is self-defeating.” On the contrary, one of them had the game we’ve been discussing wrapped up by 1902. May all your self-defeats be so successful! “The object of the exercise is to be known as trustworthy,” he pronounces; then he makes the better point that “…Any ‘trustworthy’ alliance set up in opposition to a KL alliance, would simply be acknowledgement that the KL philosophy works….”